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Abstract 
As enterprises extend internal systems and applications to external users, it is important to ensure that 
the user experience operates seamlessly between disparate organizations. To meet this challenge, 
Federated Identity Management (FIM, also single sign-on) provides an economically efficient and 
convenient way of providing connectivity to customers, partners, suppliers, and others. FIM is a topic 
of widespread discussion with rapid growth predicted for almost ten years. This growth has not 
happened. This prescriptive study identifies some key factors contributing to the slow adoption of 
FIM technology, including technological complexities, lack of trust between partners, and the 
complications and expenditures involved in establishing and maintaining contractual agreements 
between partners. 
Keywords  
Federated identity management, single sign-on, access management, identity management, SAML, 
WS-* 
1.0 Background 
Federated Identity Management (FIM) refers to a collection of technologies and solutions that enable 
organizations to trust each other’s user authentication in a single sign-on (SSO), mainly web-enabled, 
environment (Kobielus, 2005). FIM simplifies and secures a user’s access to inter-organizational 
applications and resources through the use of a digital identity stored in a directory service that is the 
information repository about users, devices, and services, including names, locations, access rights, 
and authorizations (Loosely Coupled, 2002-2005). 
Microsoft was one of the first to conceptualize FIM with a project called code-name ‘Hailstorm,’ 
which consisted of a Microsoft-controlled database in which users registered their details to 
seamlessly browse the web. However, Microsoft failed to obtain support because of its proprietary 
ownership, leading to resistance and ultimate failure of the initiative. (Foley, 2008) Microsoft’s efforts 
ignited general interest in FIM technology and in September 2001, the Liberty Alliance, a consortium 
of major companies led by Sun Microsystems, HP, IBM, and others developed the initial 
specifications for federated identity management (De Clercq, 2006; Vierboom, 2004). 
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Where SSO technology allows users to log-in and authenticate once in co-located domains (Stallings, 
2007), FIM enables enhanced SSO that provides seamless access to systems in autonomous networks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. FIM Process Flow 
across the Internet.  Google for example uses SSO for authorization and authentication to Web-based 
applications such as Gmail and Google Calendar.  Google acts as the service provider enabling FIM 
technology for access to applications it hosts (Google, 2009). 
FIM requires both affective and technological trust relationships between the disparate partner 
organizations (Our federated ID future, 2004).  FIM establishes technological trust relationships 
though a trust service, consisting of the following:  Principal, Identity Provider (IdP), and Service 
Provider (SP) (Bhargav-Spantzel, et al., 2007).  A Principal is a primary actor in a federated 
environment and can be either a person or application identified and authorized to perform business 
tasks.  An Identity Provider (IdP) is a trust service organization that authenticates a Principal’s 
identity. IdPs can be employer, financial institution, government agency, or some other organization 
(such as VeriSign) recognized by trading parties as the Principal’s authenticating authority.  A Service 
Provider (SP) is a system entity providing a service (e.g., SaaS) to Principals.  A ‘digital identity’ is 
an electronic representation of a real-world entity, such as a user, represented by a set of attributes 
stored in a directory.  Thus, the trust relationship is a logical connection between autonomous 
networks (PCMag.com, 2009) provided through an Identity Provider to connect contractually related 
Principals and Service Providers via a digital identity.  
Process flow for identity management begins with an authorized Principal that sends a request from a 
browser to gain access to a third-party external application (SP) through a web service (Figure 1, Step 
1). The web service communicates with the FIM system’s IdP.  The IdP finds the Principal’s digital 
identify and creates an assertion token, which is returned to the Web Service (Steps 2 and 3).  Linkage 
to the external application is established through a redirect sent to the browser from the web service, 
which is an intermediary in web service-Principal communications (Step 4, repeats until the 
connection is severed). Thus, federated access is established between the user and the external 
application (Blakley, Blum, & Gebel, 2008).  
FIM includes two methods -- one for Business-to-Business (B2B) processes and transactions and one 
for Business-to-Consumer transactions (B2C). While this study focuses on the enterprise issues, it is 
essential to also understand B2C FIM.  B2C FIM also consists of two connectivity methods -- 
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relationship and credential-focused methodologies.  The relationship-focused approach maintains user 
relationships with IdPs, and each transaction conveys identity information to a SP via the appropriate 
IdP.  For the credential-focused approach, users obtain long-term credentials from an IdP but store 
them locally (Bhargav-Spantzel, et al., 2007). 
Federation is particularly useful for business processes that span multiple organizations and require 
interoperability between environments, such as financial services companies, governments, healthcare 
providers, and telecomm companies (Carr, 2008).  FIM offers benefits such as reduced identity 
management cost and increased identity security.  With federation, only the IdP maintains user 
identities, thus reducing administration and maintenance costs for all principal organizations.  
Security is enhanced because principals no longer manage identity records (Cser, 2008).  Thus, FIM 
meets requirements for secure inter-organizational access requirements and is amenable to future 
technology changes (Blakley, Blum, & Gebel, 2008).  
Since FIM appears to be a useful, mature, and secure technology, the question then is why is FIM 
adoption so slow?  As of 2007 the FIM adoption rate was less than 5% in the U.S. and lower in other 
countries (Cser, 2008).  This study is important because only in understanding reasons for slow FIM 
adoption can strategies for increasing adoption be developed.  This research evaluates FIM adoption 
by evaluating the technology challenges relating to key characteristics of FIM's relationships and 
technology:   FIM technology, FIM standards, security/privacy, trust relationship issues, and financial 
issues. 
2.0 FIM Technology 
Three basic topologies for linking federated domains are point-to-point, hub, and networked (Figure 
2).   In a point-to-point topology, two or more domains exchange assertions directly. The number of 
bilateral trust relationships required is (n * (n-1))/2, where n is the number of domains. Because trust 
relationships are expensive to establish, the number of domains federated in this fashion is usually 
necessarily small.  
In a hub topology, each participating domain (spoke) in the federation connects to a hub domain.  Hub 
topologies are best when there is little inter-spoke communication. In a networked topology, the 
federation may contain multiple hubs, and spokes may interconnect with more than one hub.  While 
not all networking is direct, large, industry-wide federations have developed features to support 
networked topologies (Blakley, Blum, & Gebel, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: FIM Topologies Source: (Blakley, Blum, & Gebel, 2008) 
3.0 Standards and Technology  
From fiascos like VHS vs. beta formats to the de facto adoption of TCP/IP, we know that adoption of 
new technology is facilitated with the support of recognized global standards.  In this section we 
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discuss the FIM technology standards, which consist of the Security Assertion Markup Language 
(SAML), Web Services-Federation (WS-Federation); and open standards for user authentication and 
access control such as OpenID (Shwartz, 2006).  Several organizations are key to FIM standards 
development including, the Liberty Alliance and Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards (OASIS).  Technology challenges relate to the number of federation protocols 
and incompatibilities primarily between SAML and WS-Federation. In addition, large vendor 
implementations lack support for all the FIM protocols, for example, Microsoft Active Directory 
Federated Services (ADFS) lacks SAML support (Scarlet, 2006).  The two most important standards – 
WS-Federation and SAML, are described in more detail to provide understanding of the technology 
challenges. 
3.1 WS-Federation 
WS-Federation will be the final element of the Web Services (WS-*) suite of security specifications 
that was designed by the Liberty Alliance as the basis for secure web services interoperability 
(Blakley, Blum, & Gebel, 2008).  WS-Security, WS-SecurityPolicy, and WS-Trust services are 
currently operational and provide a basic model for federation between IdP and SP.  The fundamental 
goal of WS-Federation is to complete the WS-* stack and deliver a suite of integrated protocols to 
address identity and security requirements of both web applications and web services ((Blakley, 
Blum, & Gebel, 2008). 
The Liberty Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF) consists of the standards for implementing SSO 
with federated identities. The framework provides the design for SSO within a Circle of Trust (CoT), 
a contractual arrangement between a group of organizations to share transaction inter-operability. It 
accomplishes this by defining protocols for account linking, global logout, and mechanisms for 
browser redirects (Liberty Alliance, 2003).  
3.2 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
SAML is an Extensible Markup Language (XML) standard for exchanging authentication and 
authorization data between security domains, using standard mechanisms for authentication.  SAML 
allows authentication authorities (IdPs); attribute authorities, and policy decision points to make 
assertions regarding the identity, attributes, and entitlements of a Principal to other entities, systems, 
or applications.  SAML protocol defines rules for requesting and responding to authentication 
requests (OASIS Security Services, 2008).  
SAML provides SSO and access management for browser requests between organizations with 
relatively simple trust relationships while the WS-* standards were designed to promote 
interoperability for all aspects of Web services, such as policy, messaging, transactions, and security.  
SAML is restricted to inter-organizational applications, while WS-* is devoted specifically to Web-
Services Security.  Thus, the two standards have some points of overlap but are essentially different 
(Microsoft, 2008).   
Liberty’s ID-FF and OASIS SAML were separate efforts in FIM standards for secure SSO.  The two 
standards intermix a variety of security technologies: Channel security consisting of server-side 
certificates for identity providers; transport layer security, Secure Socket Layer (SSL), or other 
channel security protocols, such as Internet Protocol security (IPSec), security tokens with a limited 
lifetime, cryptographic nonce, and digital signatures for single-transaction integrity (Landau & Le 
Van Gong, 2008). 
To further confuse this business space, open-source middleware, such as Shibboleth grants access 
rights to multiple systems by the use of a single set of authorization credentials (Gilbert, 2003).  
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Shibboleth has widespread use and is the foundation of the InCommon Federation used by nearly 100 
U.S. universities for, for instance, library database access (Carr, 2008). 
There are many other standards that interact with FIM but that lead to complexity and interoperability 
issues. “The variety of federation use cases and the preferences of different vendor or industry 
constituencies, […have led to a…] number of standards, or specifications” (Blakley, Blum, & Gebel, 
2008, p. 14). Figure 3 depicts FIM specifications in five core categories: profiles and services; web 
transport, session and security; Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) message security; Web-
Services token specifications; and policy management. The most likely core specifications are 
highlighted in blue (Blakley, Blum, & Gebel).    
In addition, WS-* uses multiple token formats used in its assertion process.  Other complications are 
that vendors use cryptography inconsistently in their products and that algorithms and schemas used 
to support FIM products depend on the identical configuration across member organizations (Grant, 
2008).  
Most commercial FIM products use SAML-based technologies, and most comply with the Liberty 
Alliance conformance program to ensure interoperability (Carr, 2003). SAML is more mature than 
WS-Federation and there are more products based on SAML (Carr, 2003).  There are more customer 
deployments based on SAML 1.1 than for WS-Federation.  Also, SAML 2.0 is required by U.S. 
government initiatives, such as the eAuthentication project (Microsoft, 2008). 
To spur momentum in FIM adoption, the Concordia project, a consortium organized by Liberty 
Alliance, was formed.  Its goal is to further interoperability by defining use cases and requirements for 
interactions among CardSpace, OpenID, WS-Federation, and SAML. The primary objective of 
Concordia was to accelerate the FIM adoption integrating the current multiplicity of environments 
(Concordia Project, 2007).  To summarize, confusion and inconsistency in commercial offerings is 
one reason for slow adoption rates. 
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Figure 3. WS-* and SAML Standards (Source: Blakley, Blum, & Gebel, 2008) 
3.3 FIM Technology  
The emergence of trusted identity providers, trusted broker networks, and vendors providing 
interoperability will be a cornerstone of success for FIM adoption.  Vendors have simplified 
deployment of FIM products by creating lightweight, standalone solutions that do not require large 
scale Web-based solutions.  Table 1 lists most of the prominent FIM vendors and products approved 
by Liberty Alliance, which conducts rigorous compatibility testing (Brenner, 2005).   SAML, 
OpenID, WS-Federation, and CardSpace not only support producing and accepting tokens, but also 
provide protocol translation (Cser, 2008). Trusted broker networks and workspaces provide scalable 
federation technologies to connect organizations reliably. 
There is a growing list of choices for organizations looking to federate.  Healthcare and financial 
industries lead in adoption of FIM services to comply with government regulatory requirements and 
to reduce associated data management costs. Federating access-management environments gives 
principals a set of tools to facilitate compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) (Carr, 2008), the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) (Carr), and other mandates.  
4.0 Security and Privacy  
Security is a critical concern in managing access to enterprise resources. Most vendors that specialize 
in the access control domain feel that today’s collaborative and interconnected e-business landscape 
requires a secure and effective methodology for enterprises to share trusted user identities and 
entitlements. The ability to federate identity across organizations while maintaining access rights and 
privileges continues to be a major challenge when securing online business collaboration (Bhatti, 
Betino, & Ghafoor, 2007). 
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With increases of data leakages and identity thefts, companies must be certain that federated partners 
actively practice security control with procedures that ensure compliance with regulatory directives 
and its own security policies (Carr, 2008). Nevertheless, regardless of policies and procedures, 
organizations in federated relationships accept equal responsibility in the event of a compromise. 
Security concerns with FIM technology relate primarily to the extensive exchange of sensitive 
information that traverses organizational boundaries. Securing communication channels and 
encrypting messages helps preserve the privacy of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and 
proprietary data, but is not a complete security solution. In a federated transaction, such as a user 
request to an IdP, inadequate security countermeasures could result in attacks, such as a man-in-the-
middle assault, resulting in unauthorized disclosure of information (Ahn & Lam, 2005). 
 
Almost all well-known solutions involve tradeoffs that are application centric and are less useful in a 
broader scope. Additionally, the development of Web-based federated identity solutions has advanced 
more rapidly compared to Web-based privilege management mechanisms resulting in a wide gap 
between the federated identity and privilege management mechanisms. The demand seems to be 
trending more toward an integrated comprehensive approach to access management. Because of this 
disparity, the migration of enterprise operations to the Internet demands a significant evolution of 
traditional access management mechanisms for securing dynamic Web-based resources. Federated 
identity and privilege management are both critical elements that require equal emphasis (Bhatti, 
Betino, & Ghafoor 2007). 
 
To achieve comfortable levels of assurance, FIM systems need the cooperation of all three sets of 
members -- the Principals, IdP, and SP, to establish and manage FIM security.  The SP shifts 
responsibility to the IdP for security assertions made on their behalf.  Reluctance to participate in 
federation occurs when partners lose confidence in the security measures or feel that data is used for 
other than its intended purpose.   
 
Concerns can be aligned with just about every conventional IT paradigm from compliance, security, 
and privacy to outsourcing. While privacy drives security and security enables privacy, continual risk 
reduction against unauthorized discloser is key to CoT maintenance (Landau, & Le VanGong, 2008). 
Given the sensitive nature of identity information and the very real possibilities of fraud, financial 
damage, or privacy violations, organizations will inevitably struggle with security, legality, and 
liability (Bhatti, Betino, & Ghafoor, 2007). 
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Vendor Product Supported Standards Liberty 
Alliance 
Tested 
Computer Associates (CA) Federation 
Manager 
SAML 1.0, 1.1, 2.0 
WS-Federation 
Yes 
Hewlett-Packard (HP) (Acquired 
2005) 
Trustgenix Identity 
Bridge 
SAML 1.0, 1.1, 2.0 
WS-Federation 
Yes 
IBM Tivoli Federated 
Identity Manager 
Identity Federation Framework (ID-
FF 1.x)   
SAML 1.0, 1.1, 2.0 
WS-Federation 
WS-Security 
WS-Trust 
Yes 
Microsoft 
(ADFS interoperates with SAML at 
the data level; ADFS v1 supports 
SAML 1.1 security tokens.  Microsoft 
has announced support for SAML 2.0 
tokens in ADFS v2, currently under 
development.) 
Active Directory 
Federated Services 
(ADFS) v1 
Identity Federation Framework (ID-
FF 1.x)   
WS-Federation 
WS-Security 
WS-Trust 
No 
Oracle Oracle Identity 
Federation 
Identity Federation Framework (ID-
FF 1.x)   
SAML 1.0, 1.1, 2.0 
WS-Federation 
Yes 
Ping Identity PingFederate SAML 1.0, 1.1, 2.0 
WS-Federation 
WS-Trust 
Yes 
Sun Microsystems Sun OpenSSO 
Enterprise 
Java Authentication and 
Authorization Service (JAAS) 
Kerberos 
Liberty ID-FF 
Liberty ID-WSF 
Online Certificate Status Protocol 
(OCSP) 
SAML 1.x, 2.0 
WS-Federation 
WS-I Basic Security Profile tokens 
WS-Policy 
WS-Trust 
X.509 Digital Certificates 
XML Digital Signature 
XML Encryption 
Yes 
Symlabs Federated Identity 
Suite 
Liberty Alliance (ID-WSF 2.0 & ID-
FF 1.2) 
SAML 2.0, WS-Federation 1.0  
Yes 
Open Solutions Shibboleth SAML 1.0, 1.1, 2.0 No 
Table 1.  FIM Products (Source: Liberty Alliance project, 2003) 
 
5.0 Human Issues 
This section discusses the two types of trust required in FIM relationships:  Affective relationship 
trust and technical definitional trust.  Both are sources of problems and show that the human aspects 
are more daunting than technical concerns as more organizations join a CoT, transaction-sharing 
environment.   
5.1  Affective Relationship Trust 
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Accurately making access control decisions is a critical element in trusting a Federated Identity 
system. These decisions directly protect the security of the resources involved in federated 
relationships. FIM must have dynamic controls for managing user lifecycle. Because the role of 
service providers and identity providers are sometimes inter-changeable in web services, all 
participating organizations in FIM systems must face the trust decisions implied by all possible cross-
organization interactions (Goodrich, Tarmassia, & Yao, 2008). 
Some federated relationships could be relatively simple, and as a consequence are easy to govern 
(Windley, 2006).  However, many organizations have complex business processes, and multi-
partnership relations that result in a number of factors slowing FIM adoption.  FIM implementation 
requires the mutual cooperation and commitment of all participating partners in order to develop the 
desired transparency across organizational boundaries.  
Building affective trust across autonomous principals is paramount to FIM adoption (Carr, 2008).  
Before FIM can be realized, business process owners must collaborate and trust each other.  An 
organization must be able to discern whether its CoT partners know about and adhere to their policies, 
practices, contracts, and those of the organization with the most stringent compliance efforts and 
mandates in the FIM federation (Tippett, 2006). Principals seeking to initiate federations require 
documentation, tools, services, and techniques for enabling and encouraging partners to participate.  
Issues relating to the roles, privileges and access rights for individuals on partner networks must be 
defined. Policies and procedures used by federated partners for authenticating and assigning roles to 
users also are required (Smedinghoff, 2008). The various consortia provide support to ease the 
complexity of adding new members to existing federations (Blakley, Blum, & Gebel, 2008).  Yet, 
different technology and security maturity levels among organizations continue to be a problem (Cser, 
2009). 
In effect, most existing SSO solutions assume preexisting trust relationship among providers and do 
not provide adequate mechanisms for the trust establishment between providers. This limitation 
hinders the wide deployment of SSO in web-service environments, because providers may be 
unknown to each other. Therefore, flexible, reliable and secure trust establishment mechanisms need 
to be provided to support federated identity management (Goodrich, Tarmassia, & Yao, 2008). 
Partners in federated systems are essentially vouching for the identities of their users and their access 
requirements for hosted externally services.  Network principals, roles, privileges and access rights for 
individuals on partner networks all need definition (Vijayan, 2004).  Then, a technology-based CoT 
between external partners is established to "share linked identities and have pertinent business 
agreements … regarding how to do business and interact with identities. Once a user has been 
authenticated by a CoT identity provider, that individual can easily … take part in targeted services 
from other service providers within that CoT” (Liberty Alliance, 2003, p. 6).  
Figure 4 depicts a Venn diagram with proprietary authentication relationships within each circle with 
shared identity attributes shared among overlapping circles.  Attributes from, for instance, a supply 
chain circle may be shared with the home circle (Liberty Alliance, 2003).  An example of such a 
configuration is an individual who uses an online travel agency both at work and at home.  The person 
can access his attributes regardless of their work location.  
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Figure 4: Circles of Trust (Source, Liberty Alliance, 2003) 
The Service Provider must have confidence that the Identity Provider will both manage and 
authenticate users on behalf of the SP.  Trusting a partner to authenticate its own users requires the 
partner to have solid security and identity management practices (Carr, 2008). 
FIM raises critical legal issues that often are ignored because of technology emphasis.  Failure to 
recognize and address the legal contractual requirements can delay or cause failure of FIM adoption 
partnerships (Smedinghoff, 2008).  Federation partners must be able to establish agreements outlining 
the compulsory assurance of identity information.  Contractual agreements cause delays because of 
their inherent complexity, especially when delineating partner liability (ABA, 2009; Baldwin, et al., 
2007).  
Hub-and-spoke federations, in which all principals share a hub with a single dominant principal, are a 
relatively simple FIM organization from a legal perspective.  All interaction is between the hub and its 
spokes, as depicted in Figure 2.  For example, Wal-Mart as a strong central principal requires 
suppliers to adopt its identity management practices to do business.  In such a case, the dominant 
principal dictates the trust requirements to the other principals (Carr, 2008). 
5.2  Technological Trust 
Once affective trust is developed, it is translated into a technological trust definition.  Principals 
require development of an Identity and Access Management (IAM) framework to which all partners 
comply before FIM can be fully developed and managed.  Good governance and robust 
implementation of each organization’s internal identity and access management are critical to creating 
a federated partnership network.  Principals need to address internal IAM issues first and agree on the 
levels of security, privacy, and trustingness.  Yet many organizations have not implemented business 
processes for managing their own internal identities (Cser, 2008).  Such organizations would be 
precluded from FIM networks. 
The complexity in managing dynamic federation agreements through technology is another inhibiting 
factor in FIM adoption (Cser, 2009). Federation advocates say that once the agreements are in place, 
the technology allows for richer partner integration, faster, cheaper coupling through standards, 
simplified customer experience, and better protection of customer information (Brenner, 2008). 
In recent years, several identity federations have been established in higher education around the 
world. Typically these institutions systematically establish federations within a national scope, but the 
need for cross-border collaboration has led to the first interconnects of national federations. The 
Kalmar Union was established as a cross-federation of the Nordic academic identity federations. Trust 
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relationships between federated organizations such as education tend to be less problematic. The 
federation established between Nordic national federations and the Kalmar Union posed few obstacles 
from a technical perspective due to efforts by the standards committees developing stringent controls.  
The reality seems different though as partnership coordination adds significant complexity to 
contractual agreements. Challenges such as cross-border legislative agreements tend to be problematic 
and difficult to resolve. In regard to federation agreements, policy makers do not have former 
precedence to rely on thus resulting in policy versus technological obstructions hampering widespread 
acceptance (Walter, Ingrid, & Mikael, 2007).  
6.0 Return on Investment (ROI) 
Cost-effective initiatives are fundamental to cause complex changes, such as FIM, in the business 
environment (Gebel, 2008).  Contrary to initial claims that FIM has many cost reduction benefits, 
savings can accrue in several areas: Reduced security administration costs, reduced logon times,  and 
reduced help desk call volume associated with password resets. Administrative costs are reduced 
because identify and access management for the federation partners is outsourced to the Identity 
Provider.  Thus, the costs are shifted to another organization. 
Savings from reduced logon times can be significant but are dependent on organization size.  If a 
$100,000 employee has five logon sequences per day that would be replaced by one logon sequence 
in FIM, huge savings can accrue.  For instance, five logons at 30 seconds each over a 260-day year 
takes 11 man-hours of time and costs the organization about $450/year in lost productivity.  In a large 
organization with, for instance, 10,000 such employees, the increase in productivity is worth about 
$4.5 million per year and 52 fewer people are required to do the same amount of work for an 
additional savings of $5.2 million. From this analysis, the potential for significant cost savings, which 
were doubtful three years ago, have become substantial and attainable with mature identify and access 
management (Witty, et al., 2006; Perkins, 2009). 
A final source of savings is from help desk calls that would be outsourced to the Service Provider.  As 
much as 85% reduction in help desk calls substantially reduces credential management cost for the 
individual principal organizations (Carr, 2008).  Non-monetary benefits accrue from the improvement 
in user convenience.  Convenience is one of the main benefits of FIM (Witty, et al., 2006).  To gain 
these improvements, investments in FIM require solid business process management to ensure the 
savings (Witty, et al.). 
7.0 Discussion 
Federated identity is a topic of widespread interest; however, the adoption rate is lower than expected. 
Some FIM challenges are to integrate business processes across organizational boundaries, 
simplifying access requirements to disparate systems through the use of a single identity FIM.  The 
reluctance of organizations to adopt the technology relates to interoperability between dissimilar 
technologies and protocols, delegation of access control management to a third-party provider, uneven 
maturity of IAM management, reluctance to form trust relationships between partners, and the 
complexities and costs to establish contractual agreements between organizations that meet required 
regulatory compliance.   
The major reason why FIM adoption remains slow relate to lack of affective relationship trust with 
reliance on unknown people and processes, legal complications, and technology inconsistencies.  
Therefore, technology is not the main issue, people are. 
  12
Beyond the CoT, affective trust relationships with the intricate legal agreements assigning culpability 
in the event of a security breech are difficult to attain.  Lawyers, by training are untrusting and it is 
unclear how to define trust in a contract.  Bilateral multi-organizational agreements do not scale and 
are costly and complicated to develop and maintain (Cser, 2009).  
CoT relationships require process maturity that is at least similar across all expected federation 
partners.  Organizations at different maturity levels for security and access management have 
difficulty in arriving at anything other than bi-lateral, hub-spoke relationships because the weakest 
link in the relationship defines the level of security. 
7.1 Recommendations 
Enterprises should aggressively investigate the capabilities of FIM. FIM can provide a methodology 
that can help organizations tighten security, reduce administration costs, and improve the overall IT 
experience for its users.  
Management buy-in and senior leadership support is paramount to the success of any enterprise 
technology adoption. Executive managers  must be convinced that the adoption of FIM technology 
will facilitate organizational strategy, be cost effective, and benefit the organization. To that extent, 
deploying federation in multiple organizations requires sponsorship, leadership, and cross-
organizational support. 
Concerns with the liberal sharing of identity information common in organizations often over 
unsecure channels require legal and business negotiation and continuous monitoring.  Stringent 
controls that meet all legal and regulatory of the most regulated partner are required by all federation 
parties to safeguard sensitive information.  
Security and privacy management of the Identify Provider must be more robust than that of any of the 
federation partners.  Constant monitoring and management of the on-going FIM relationships and 
transaction processes is needed.  The identity mapping process should be capable of ensuring that 
identity information is correctly used; that data are verified, updated when information is added or 
changed; and that data are not retained longer than necessary.  The process also should be capable of 
ensuring IT systems are managed properly, and identity information is not accessible to anyone but 
federation members (Baldwin, Mont, Beres, & Shiu, 2008). 
7.2. Limitations and Future Research 
This research evaluates only organization-level FIM.  Future work should evaluate user-centric FIM.  
Technology, in terms of operating environment, was ignored in this discussion.  Yet, there is some 
evidence that new technologies, such as cloud computing, will impact FIM efforts in as yet unknown 
ways.  Future research could evaluate operating environment impacts on FIM adoption by both 
individuals and organizations.  
Further research on vendors such as IBM, Microsoft, and Sun to obtain current FIM technology 
assessments and evaluate their campaigns on FIM adoption would be highlight industry aspects of 
FIM.  Evaluation of FIM early adopters, such as American Express, Boeing, General Motors, Nokia, 
and Proctor & Gamble, to define factors leading to their FIM acquisition would provide functional 
requirements for others to evaluate.  Also, by evaluating individual company aspects of FIM, a FIM 
methodology for access and security management could be developed to aide less mature 
organizations in making the move to FIM. 
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Other future research could evaluate financial aspects of FIM to determine the breakeven point for 
FIM adoption and maintenance versus traditional IAM management. 
8.0 Summary 
This prescriptive research analyzes the reasons for slow adoption of FIM technology, which has been 
commercialized for over five years and had high expectations of swift adoption.  FIM adoption is 
slowed primarily by the difficulties in the inter-organizational trust relationships required for FIM but 
also by uneven organizational maturity, and the plethora of different solutions accompanied by little 
common knowledge about their differences and similarities.   
The financial analysis shows that FIM can be cost-beneficial for large organization but the scale 
remains unknown.  Future research on different types of FIM, different vendor offerings, and the cost 
dynamics for FIM technology and company demographics all are areas for further research. 
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